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EMILY LEE*
Problems of Judicial Recognition and Enforcement in
Cross-Border Insolvency Matters Between
Hong Kong and Mainland China†
This Article first explores whether it is legally possible to extend
the Arrangement on Reciprocal Recognition and Enforcement of
Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters by the Courts of the
Mainland and of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region Pur-
suant to Choice of Court Agreements between Parties Concerned to
cover cross-border insolvency matters between Hong Kong and main-
land China and, if so, the advantages and disadvantages of so doing.
It then examines other alternatives for facilitating judicial recognition
and enforcement of judgments between the courts in Hong Kong and
mainland China that focus specifically on cross-border insolvency
judgments (including court orders) that concern both Hong Kong and
mainland China, such as signing a new arrangement, a special treaty,
or a Memorandum of Understanding. It seeks to highlight the defi-
ciencies of the Arrangement as well as discuss the options to remedy
those deficiencies. The situation for Hong Kong–China cross-border
insolvency cases is opaque due to the lack of local cross-border insol-
vency legislation in Hong Kong. In China, there is only one article
(article 5) of the 2006 Enterprise Bankruptcy Law that concerns cross-
border insolvency, but that article is inapplicable to Hong
Kong–China cross-border insolvency cases. That article is inapplica-
ble because it applies only to cross-border insolvency cases involving a
foreign state. Since Hong Kong is not a foreign state, it is precluded
from the article’s application. Also, Hong Kong and China have not
adopted the UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency. Al-
though internationally accepted soft law standards such as the Model
Law can provide institutional guidance to cross-border insolvency
matters, it is compatible with Hong Kong–China cross-border insol-
vency cases only when a third jurisdiction is involved. The lack of a
formal judicial recognition mechanism for Hong Kong-China cross-
border insolvency judgments creates problems such as legal uncer-
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tainty and forum shopping. This Article aims to raise awareness of the
difficulties facing practitioners involved in Hong Kong–China cross-
border insolvency cases and to share academic perspectives on the
issue.
INTRODUCTION
Disputes from cross-border corporate insolvencies (CBI) between
the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (HKSAR) and main-
land China (hereinafter, “HK-China CBI”) occur frequently, and a
customized solution is long overdue; but there is no sign from either
government of establishing any formal judicial assistance and recog-
nition mechanism in light of this issue in the near future. In order to
enforce insolvency judgments that have cross-border implications, a
mutual judicial recognition mechanism is required. In the context of
this Article, CBI judgments or orders refer to those made by the
courts in Hong Kong or mainland China which would be enforced in
the counterparty’s jurisdiction. For example, CBI judgments or or-
ders made by the Hong Kong courts need to be recognized by the
mainland Chinese courts prior to being enforced in mainland China,
and vice versa.
Without a formal judicial recognition mechanism in place and in
operation, insolvency practitioners appointed in Hong Kong must be
innovative and strategically plan for the possibility that subsequent
insolvency proceedings may take place in mainland China by taking
administrative action such as changing the legal representatives and
management personnel of Chinese subsidiary companies. This ad-
ministrative measure of changing legal representatives has a certain
innovative aspect to it because it is a means to sidestep the problem
of a lack of judicial assistance and recognition mechanism for HK-
China CBI cases. It would not be required, however, if a clearly
stated insolvency procedure with legal certainty for all concerned
parties existed. Understandably, a change of legal representatives is
not intrinsic to corporate insolvencies as it can also happen where, for
example, there is a shareholder dispute. And even if a change of legal
representatives helps in creditors’ rights enforcement, it would be left
to the vagaries of mainland China’s Administration for Industry and
Commerce, which may or may not permit it.
Judicial recognition is a rather practical issue; the mainland Chi-
nese courts usually would not have any problem recognizing the
liquidators or provisional liquidators who are appointed by the Hong
Kong courts, provided that the company in liquidation is incorporated
in Hong Kong.1 In theory, the Administration for Industry and Com-
1. For example, in Securities and Futures Comm’n v. China Metal Recycling
(Holdings) Limited, HCCW 210/2013, (C.F.I. Nov. 12, 2014) (Legal Reference System)
(H.K.), the two provisional liquidators were appointed by the Hong Kong court.
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merce will respect the order given by the Chinese court to allow a
change of legal representatives, but in practice, they may try to delay
this change through administrative action, for example: (1) requiring
the consent of the existing legal representatives to the change of legal
representatives; (2) requiring the resignation of the existing legal
representatives before the change of legal representatives; (3) requir-
ing that the existing legal representatives relinquish the official
corporate seal, a device necessary to officiate corporate documents,
including the authorization of the change of legal representatives—a
device that is typically controlled by the legal representatives as a
symbol of their authority; and/or (4) simply withholding the registra-
tion without giving any reason. For an offshore company undergoing
liquidation, the liquidator must be appointed by the court from the
offshore company’s place of incorporation.
Part I explains why judicial recognition and assistance between
Hong Kong and mainland Chinese courts, which are required for en-
forcing judgments or orders made in HK-China CBI cases, are a
matter of regional conflict of laws. Part II explores the possibility of
extending the Arrangement on Reciprocal Recognition and Enforce-
ment of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters by the Courts of
the Mainland and of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region
Pursuant to Choice of Court Agreements Between Parties Concerned2
(the Arrangement) to cover HK-China CBI matters. Part III exam-
ines other available options for enabling mutual judicial recognition
and assistance between Hong Kong and mainland China. Part IV
provides assessments and comments on these possible options. The
conclusion sets out final remarks.
I. REGIONAL CONFLICT OF LAWS
Before Hong Kong was returned to Chinese sovereignty, it was
regarded as a foreign jurisdiction by mainland China. Ironically, even
after the return of Hong Kong to China in 1997, Hong Kong has still
been regarded as a foreign jurisdiction by mainland China, as evi-
denced by a judicial interpretation issued in 2002 by the Supreme
People’s Court in China titled Provisions Concerning the Jurisdiction
Problems of Foreign-Related Civil and Commercial Cases (the “Provi-
sion”; emphasis added), article 5 of which prescribes that “the
jurisdiction of civil and commercial cases involving HKSAR, Macao
SAR and Taiwan litigants shall be solved by referring to the Provi-
2. Signed by the Supreme People’s Court (China) and Department of Justice
(Hong Kong Special Administrative Region), July 14, 2006, available at http://www.
legislation.gov.hk/intracountry/eng/pdf/mainlandrej20060719e.pdf [hereinafter
Arrangement].
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sion.”3 Under the rubric of “One Country, Two Systems,” two judicial
systems (i.e., those of Hong Kong and mainland China) began to oper-
ate in parallel within one country.4 Guobin Zhu has suggested that
conflict of laws between the HKSAR and mainland China “is seen in
a ‘vertical’ sense, so it cannot be regulated by an analogy of general
conflict of laws rules.”5 On the other hand, if the conflict of laws is
between the HKSAR and a province or another autonomous region in
China, then such a conflict would be treated at a horizontal level.6
This horizontal-level classification has inspired academics to invent a
theory of regional conflict of laws (also referred to by some commenta-
tors, such as Guobin Zhu, as inter-regional conflict of laws) in order to
cope with conflict-of-laws cases involving the courts in Hong Kong
and those in mainland China.
The HKSAR and mainland China’s interwoven history paved the
way for dual legal systems within one sovereign nation. The Joint
Declaration of the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Brit-
ain and Northern Ireland and the Government of the People’s
Republic of China on the Question of Hong Kong (the “Sino-British
Joint Declaration”) announced on December 19, 1984 that the colony
of Hong Kong would be returned to China as the HKSAR on July 1,
1997.7 The Declaration was an agreement between China and the
United Kingdom, with China guaranteeing the HKSAR’s freedoms
and pluralism under the rule of law for fifty years, beginning on the
date of return.
Six years after Hong Kong reverted to Chinese sovereignty as the
HKSAR, the Closer Economic Partnership Arrangement (CEPA), an
economic agreement to foster and facilitate bilateral trades between
Hong Kong and mainland China, was signed on June 29, 2003. CEPA
laid out the basis for economic integration between the HKSAR and
mainland China under the political arrangement of the “One Coun-
try, Two Systems” principle which enabled the HKSAR’s capitalist
and mainland China’s socialist economies to coexist under the same
sovereign nation but operate within separate legal and business
frameworks. Since the signing of CEPA, the two sides have concluded
3. Xinyi Gong, When Hong Kong Becomes SAR, Is the Mainland Ready?
Problems of Judgments Recognition in Cross-Border Insolvency Matters, 20 INT’L IN-
SOLVENCY REV. 57, 58 (2011).
4. Id. at 57.
5. Guobin Zhu, Inter-regional Conflict of Laws under “One Country, Two Sys-
tems”: Revisiting Chinese Legal Theories and Chinese and Hong Kong Law, with
Special Reference to Judicial Assistance, 32 H.K. L.J. 615, 626 (2002).
6. Id. at 627.
7. Joint Declaration of the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain
and Northern Ireland and the Government of the People’s Republic of China on the
Question of Hong Kong, Dec. 19, 1984, U.K.-P.R.C., GR. BRIT. T.S. No. 20 (Cd. 9352),
available at http://www.legislation.gov.hk/blis_ind.nsf/CurAllEngDoc/034B10AF5D30
58DB482575EE000EDB9F?OpenDocument [hereinafter Sino-British Joint
Declaration].
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a number of supplemental agreements to broaden its coverage; the
latest, Supplement IX, was signed on June 29, 2012, exactly nine
years after CEPA was first signed.8 Mainland China is Hong Kong’s
largest trading partner, according to the latest Hong Kong Govern-
ment Yearbook: “The ‘External Direct Investment Statistics of Hong
Kong 2011’ released by the Census and Statistics Department indi-
cates that Hong Kong’s FDI [foreign direct investment] inflow in 2011
amounted to [HKD]$751.8 billion . . . [Of all FDI source countries or
territories,] [t]he mainland of China was the largest, accounting for
36.3 per cent of the total as at the end of 2011.”9 Yet in spite of closer
integration through CEPA, mainland China and the HKSAR still re-
mained, and continue to remain, two separate judicial jurisdictions;
as a result, judicial assistance and recognition of court judgments and
orders remain a problem between mainland China and the HKSAR.
In our modern era of globalization, failing or failed companies
with business interests in multiple jurisdictions disrupt international
trade and commerce unless CBI laws enable their orderly restructur-
ing or liquidation across multiple jurisdictions. The bankruptcy of
Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. in 2008 is the quintessential CBI: the
U.S. investment bank’s bankruptcy resulted in more than seventy-
five insolvency proceedings in 16 jurisdictions concerning US$619 bil-
lion in debt and 25,000 employees worldwide.10 This type of CBI is
nonetheless distinct from HK-China CBI; while there is a border be-
tween the HKSAR and mainland China, it is not a border as usually
understood in the context of the United Nations Commission on In-
ternational Trade Law (UNCITRAL) Model Law on Cross-Border
Insolvency. Under the context of this Model Law, the term “foreign”
is used to describe a collective judicial or administrative proceeding
in a “foreign State,” which intrinsically excludes Hong Kong due to its
status as a SAR within its sovereign, China.11 As such, it is impor-
tant to note that although internationally accepted soft law
standards such as the Model Law can provide institutional guidance
on CBI matters, they are not entirely compatible with HK-China CBI
cases, unless the cases involve a third jurisdiction such as, typically,
a tax haven jurisdiction. Edward Middleton, Head of Restructuring
8. GOVERNMENT OF HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION, GOVERNMENT
YEARBOOK 2012, ch. 5 (Commerce and Industry), at 91, http://www.yearbook.gov.hk/
2012/en/pdf/E05.pdf.
9. Id. at 87.
10. U.N. COMM’N ON INT’L TRADE LAW, UNCITRAL PRACTICE GUIDE ON CROSS-
BORDER INSOLVENCY COOPERATION 123, U.N. Sales No. E.10.V.6 (2009), http://www
.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/insolven/Practice_Guide_Ebook_eng.pdf. See also Em-
ily Lee, Investor Protection in Lehman Brothers’ Insolvency Litigation, 7 J. COMP. L.,
no. 2, 2012, at 284, 284.
11. U.N. COMM’N ON INT’L TRADE LAW, UNCITRAL MODEL LAW ON CROSS-BORDER
INSOLVENCY art. 2, U.N. Sales No. E.14.V.2 (1997), http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/en-
glish/texts/insolven/insolvency-e.pdf.
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Services at KPMG Hong Kong, suggests that “[a]lmost all of our work
is cross-border, an inevitable consequence of Hong Kong’s relation-
ship with mainland China . . . and of the wide-spread use by Hong
Kong companies, listed and private, of off-shore jurisdictions such as
Bermuda, the Cayman Islands and the British Virgin Islands.”12 Re-
cent case law in Hong Kong has further strengthened the insolvency
practitioner’s viewpoint: in two separate and unrelated HK-China
CBI cases involving Moulin Global Eyecare Trading Limited13 and
Ocean Grand Holdings Ltd.,14 there was a common ground sug-
gesting that HK-China CBI typically involved companies whose
assets and/or investors were located in both jurisdictions, with inves-
tors located in Hong Kong, and with the joint venture (JV)
investment located in mainland China. Understandably, the main-
land Chinese courts will have jurisdiction because China is the JV’s
place of incorporation and is also the location of the JV’s assets. Yet
the Hong Kong courts can also claim jurisdiction, if and when the
JV’s investors who reside in Hong Kong commence insolvency pro-
ceedings in the Hong Kong courts against the JV. The insolvency
proceedings can become even more circuitous if, in the establishment
of the JV, the Hong Kong investors incorporated a company in a tax
haven jurisdiction, with the objective of investing in the JV. Since
neither Hong Kong nor mainland China has adopted the Model Law,
this type of HK-China CBI case explains why the divergence of Hong
Kong’s insolvency law from mainland China’s Enterprise Bankruptcy
Law (EBL)15 cannot be easily amended by applying universal insol-
vency soft law standards such as those set out in the Model Law.
In fact, Hong Kong and mainland China have different insol-
vency laws. In Hong Kong, although it does not have a uniform
corporate insolvency law, statutory provisions relating to corporate
insolvency are embedded in the Companies Ordinance16 and its sub-
sidiary legislation, such as the Companies (Winding-Up) Rules.17 In
mainland China, by contrast, the EBL is China’s singular corporate
insolvency law. Moreover, in reality, of the few countries that have
12. Global Insolvency Practice Course: Alumni—Edward S. Middleton, INTERNA-
TIONAL ASSOCIATION OF RESTRUCTURING, INSOLVENCY & BANKRUPTCY PROFESSIONALS,
https://www.insol.org/INSOLfaculty/fellows.php?a=16.
13. Re Moulin Global Eyecare Holdings Ltd, [2007] 4 H.K.L.R.D. 315, [2007]
HKEC 409 (C.F.I.).
14. Re Ocean Grand Holdings Ltd., [2008] HKEC 664, HCMP 120/2008 (C.F.I.
Apr. 15, 2008) (Legal Reference System).
15. Zhong Hua Ren Min Gong He Guo Qi Ye Po Chan Fa (
) [Enterprise Bankruptcy Law of the People’s Republic of China] (promulgated by
the Standing Comm., Nat’l People’s Cong., Aug. 27, 2006, effective June 1, 2007)
LawInfoChina No. CLI.1.7895(EN), translated at http://www.lawinfochina.com/dis
play.aspx?id=5425&lib=law.
16. Companies (Winding Up and Miscellaneous Provisions) Ordinance, (2014)
Cap. 32.
17. Companies (Winding-Up) Rules, (2005) Cap. 32H.
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adopted the Model Law into their domestic insolvency laws, many
have amended it contrary to the intention of the drafters. Conse-
quently, it is reasonable to expect that the international protocols set
by the Model Law can be breached, if and when the national insol-
vency law does not conform with the Model Law or the court
presiding over the insolvency case chooses not to adopt it.
A CBI concerns a failing or failed debtor company whose credi-
tors, assets, and/or place of incorporation are located in different
jurisdictions. Therefore, restructuring or liquidation of the debtor
company occurs in multiple jurisdictions; and judicial decisions con-
cerning that restructuring or liquidation made in one jurisdiction
may not be recognized or enforced in another. Judicial recognition or
assistance in recognizing a judgment or award falls into the area of
private international law (i.e., conflict of laws). An example will serve
to illustrate the importance of judicial recognition and enforcement in
CBI cases: Company A’s place of incorporation and business opera-
tions are in Hong Kong. In order to ensure a steady supply of raw
materials for Company A’s manufacturing business, a JV was estab-
lished in mainland China. As a result of an economic slowdown, the
JV fell into financial difficulty and failed to pay its debts to its credi-
tors when they were due. A creditor of the JV applied for its
insolvency in mainland China, but the creditor also named Company
A as a second defendant, as he feared that the JV’s insolvency meant
it lacked the ability to pay its debts but that Company A, as a JV
shareholder, might have funds to repay them. Subsequently, a liqui-
dator was appointed by a court in Hong Kong. Cooperation between
courts in Hong Kong and mainland China is necessary and critical
considering that Hong Kong and mainland China have different in-
solvency laws and procedures for appointing liquidators. Therefore,
in all CBI cases, granting judicial recognition of foreign judicial deci-
sions or providing judicial assistance can contribute greatly to a quick
yet orderly resolution of a CBI dispute.
A. Judicial Recognition for Cross-Border Instances Before the
Reversion of Sovereignty
Before China resumed sovereignty over Hong Kong on July 1,
1997, China regarded Hong Kong as a foreign jurisdiction and, as
such, judicial recognition between them was sought through interna-
tional conventions, namely the New York Convention and the Hague
Convention.18 However, after the reversion of sovereignty, interna-
tional conventions could no longer be applied because under
international law, “an international convention may only be applied
among states as independent subjects of the international commu-
18. See infra text accompanying notes 52–55.
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nity, but not directly to any part of a country without
transplantation.”19 HK-China CBI thus became subject to neither in-
ternational nor traditional domestic laws. This legal lacuna poses
challenges to Hong Kong and mainland Chinese courts in granting
mutual judicial recognition to assist each respective jurisdiction in
the restructuring or liquidation of companies, and in ensuring that
justice is done in resolving CBI disputes.
B. Judicial Recognition for Cross-Border Instances After the
Reversion of Sovereignty
The existing legal framework for judicial recognition between
Hong Kong and mainland China lies with the Arrangement, which
was adopted at the 1,390th Meeting of the Judicial Committee of the
Supreme People’s Court (SPC) on June 12, 2006. The Arrangement
took effect on August 1, 2008 after consensus was reached by both
signatories, the SPC and the HKSAR government. However, as its
name suggests, the Arrangement applies only to civil and commercial
matters, and does not cover CBI matters. This unsettled CBI issue
ought to be resolved, sooner rather than later, given Hong Kong’s sta-
tus as a global financial center and China’s as the world’s second-
largest economy. Moreover, as a result of these statuses, their respec-
tive courts are frequently asked to adjudicate on CBI disputes, even
though neither jurisdiction has adopted the Model Law.
In the following sections, the author will examine methods to fill
the legal lacuna and resolve the unsettled CBI issue: specifically,
whether it is legally possible to extend the Arrangement to cover HK-
China CBI matters; whether a bilateral agreement or treaty that fo-
cuses on mutual judicial recognition of CBI judgments will be signed;
and whether Hong Kong and mainland Chinese courts are likely to
sign a Memorandum of Understanding for CBI judicial recognition.
II. OPTION NUMBER ONE: EXTENDING THE ARRANGEMENT
TO COVER CBI MATTERS
In Hong Kong, a foreign judgment may be enforced either by
statute or at common law. The coming into effect of the Arrangement
in August 2008 resulted in the enactment of the Mainland Judg-
ments (Reciprocal Enforcement) Ordinance,20 which is now part of
Hong Kong law. Also, under the Foreign Judgments (Reciprocal En-
forcement) Ordinance,21 a final and conclusive judgment made by a
19. Weidong Zhu, The Relationships Between China and Its Special Administra-
tive Regions and Their Regulation, 4 J. CAMBRIDGE STUD. 111, 117 (2009).
20. Mainland Judgments (Reciprocal Enforcement) Ordinance, (2008) Cap. 597.
21. Foreign Judgments (Reciprocal Enforcement) Ordinance, (1997) Cap. 319,
was enacted in May 1960; in its text, Hong Kong is still referred to as a (British)
colony.
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foreign superior court may be recognized and enforced in Hong Kong
on a reciprocal basis, subject to that foreign judgment being regis-
tered with the High Court of Hong Kong.
There are a few salient features about the Arrangement. First, it
covers only judgments that are final and conclusive, as required by
paragraph 2(c) of the “Key Features” of the Arrangement.22 Under
the Arrangement, in the context of mainland China, a judgment re-
fers to one made by (1) the SPC;23 (2) a court of first instance, such as
the Higher or Intermediate People’s Court, or a designated Basic
Level People’s Court that has been authorized to exercise jurisdiction
in civil and commercial cases of the first instance involving foreign or
Hong Kong parties and from which no appeal is allowed, either ac-
cording to the law or in respect of which the time limit for appeal has
expired and/or no appeal has been filed;24 or (3) a court of the second
instance.25 A judgment can also be made in accordance with the trial
supervision procedure by bringing the case up for retrial by a people’s
court at the next higher level.26 In the context of Hong Kong, a judg-
ment in the meaning of the Arrangement refers to one made by the
District Court of Hong Kong or a higher level court.27 The second sali-
ent feature of the Arrangement is that it covers only “civil and
commercial cases” and, as such, insolvency cases are excluded from
its application. Judicial recognition of HK-China CBI cases thus falls
into a legislative lacuna.
Extending the Arrangement is arguably the most effective ap-
proach to be undertaken in closing the gap, since it is an existing
agreement that already serves the purpose of judicial recognition and
enforcement of judicial decisions between Hong Kong and mainland
Chinese courts. However, the proposition to extend the Arrangement
has met with opposing views from various parties.
A. Practical Concerns
Extending the Arrangement to cover judgments for HK-China
CBI cases has evident advantages, given that the Arrangement has
laid down a solid foundation for reciprocal judicial recognition and
enforcements of judgments made by courts of either side. While appli-
cation of the Arrangement is restricted only to those of civil and
22. Key Features of the Arrangement on Reciprocal Recognition and Enforcement
of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters by the Courts of the Mainland and of
the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region Pursuant to Choice of Court Agreements
between Parties Concerned (n.d.), DEPT. OF JUSTICE, GOVT. OF THE HONG KONG SPE-
CIAL ADMIN. REGION, http://www.doj.gov.hk/eng/topical/pdf/mainlandrej20060717e.
pdf.
23. Arrangement, supra note 2, art. 2(1)(i).
24. Id. art. 2(1)(ii).
25. Id.
26. Id. art. 2, ¶ 3.
27. Id. art. 2(2).
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commercial matters, the author argues that the Arrangement is still
not fully compatible with HK-China CBI cases, even absent such a
restriction. That is because the Arrangement covers only judgments
that relate to disputes in which the parties concerned have agreed in
written form to designate a people’s court of the Mainland or a court
of the HKSAR as the forum to have sole jurisdiction for resolving
such dispute.28 Whether or not the written agreement on choice of
court (the “Choice of Court Agreement”) is a first-threshold require-
ment is unclear; and therefore, this clause of the Arrangement leaves
plenty of room for debate. The author argues that if one is to accept
the Choice of Court Agreement as a necessary and first-threshold re-
quirement, then, to borrow the words of Professor Andrew Phang,
“this is due to the adoption of a strictly doctrinal ‘black letter’ ap-
proach towards the law [or rather, the Arrangement], overlooking (in
the process) the important factors of history and context (including
that of the personalities [of the parties] involved).”29 Instead of apply-
ing a doctrinal approach to interpreting the Arrangement, a
substantive law approach for upholding property rights protection
should be taken as an underlying principle, on which Hong Kong and
mainland Chinese courts base their decisions on whether to grant or
reject judicial recognition for parties involved in HK-China CBI
cases. The author further argues that the Choice of Court Agreement
should not be strictly required to the extent that without such an
agreement, final judicial judgments will not be enforced. A flexible
approach as advocated here is intended to ensure that, once a dispute
has been settled in Hong Kong, a duplicative suit will not be filed in
China, or vice versa. Failing to achieve this flexible approach, the im-
pact of the Arrangement will be undercut significantly. Since the SPC
is predisposed to interpreting legal questions arising from the Ar-
rangement in the interests of both mainland China and the HKSAR,
the author suggests that the Court should issue a clear interpretation
as to whether or not the Choice of Court Agreement (as indicated in
Article 1 of the Arrangement) is a first-threshold requirement.
But supposing that the Choice of Court Agreement is in fact in-
terpreted as constituting a requirement, then the author argues that
the requirement—i.e., signing an agreement to indicate that either a
Hong Kong or mainland Chinese court is to be the choice of court—
cannot be easily satisfied by some concerned parties involved in CBI
disputes. There are at least two reasons for this: First, the creditor
does not always enter into a Choice of Court Agreement with the
debtor company prior to the occurrence of a debt or dispute. This is
especially true if both parties have a long-term business relationship
28. Id. art. 3, ¶ 1.
29. Andrew Phang, Implied Terms, Business Efficacy and the Officious By-
stander—A Modern History, 1998 J. BUS. L. 1, 16.
\\jciprod01\productn\C\COM\63-2\COM202.txt unknown Seq: 11  4-AUG-15 14:01
2015] PROBLEMS OF JUDICIAL RECOGNITION AND ENFORCEMENT 449
or when the debtor company is still substantially solvent. In this re-
gard, the official Interpretation of the Arrangement by the SPC is
relevant.30 Article 3 of the Interpretation provides that “A ‘choice of
court agreement in writing’ referred to in this Arrangement means
any agreement in written form made . . . for resolving any dispute
which has arisen or may arise in respect of a particular legal relation-
ship.”31 The author interprets this paragraph to mean that even if
the Choice of Court Agreement were not entered into before the dis-
pute arises by parties concerned and were not a part of a main
contract that gives rise to the debtor company’s payment obligation, a
subsequent and separate Choice of Court Agreement can still be made
by the parties concerned after the dispute arises, so as to meet the
requirement within Article 1 of the Arrangement. This is true be-
cause a Choice of Court Agreement is independent from the main
agreement. The invalidity of the former (or the complete lack of it)
thus would not, or should not, adversely impact on the latter. Compli-
ance with this requirement (again, presuming a Choice of Court
Agreement even constitutes a requirement) thus centers on whether
the parties concerned will be willing and prepared to designate a
mainland Chinese or Hong Kong court as their court of choice. This
last point provides the second reason why the requirement in Article
1 of the Arrangement may not be easily satisfied by some parties:
they might have deliberately avoided designating mainland Chinese
courts to adjudicate their CBI cases. Judicial corruption is still per-
ceived as rampant in mainland China.32 Although the problem has
improved due to recent anti-corruption and judicial reform efforts, it
remains a concern for some people who believe that mainland Chi-
nese courts obstruct justice. Concerned parties would thus avoid
designating any mainland Chinese court as their court of choice.
This, therefore, renders Article 1 of the Arrangement extremely diffi-
cult to apply. On the other hand, if Article 1 of the Arrangement is to
be strictly imposed on parties, it would operate more like a hurdle
rather than a requirement, for those who do not wish to name a
30. Or, in full: Zui Gao Ren Min Fa Yuan Jie Shi Guan Yu Nei Di Yu Xiang Gang
Te Bie Xing Zheng Qu Fa Yuan Xiang Hu Ren Ke He Zhi Xing Dang Shi Ren Xie Yi
Guan Xia De Min Shang Shi An Jian Pan Jue De An Pai (
) [In-
terpretation by the Supreme People’s Court on the Arrangement on Reciprocal Recog-
nition and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters by the Courts
of the Mainland and of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region Pursuant to
Choice of Court Agreements Between Parties Concerned], Judicial Interpretation No.
9 of 2008 (adopted at the 1,390th meeting of the Judicial Committee of the Supreme
People’s Court on June 12, 2006, promulgated July 4, 2008) [hereinafter
Interpretation].
31. Id. art. 3.
32. Ling Li, Corruption in China’s Courts, in JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE IN CHINA:
LESSONS FOR GLOBAL RULE OF LAW PROMOTION 196, 201 (Randall Peerenboom ed.,
2010).
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mainland Chinese court as their court of choice but otherwise wish to
enforce a foreign judgment in mainland China.
Besides judicial corruption, mainland Chinese courts have often
been criticized for granting favorable judgments to local enterprises
at the expense of foreign parties, a practice which is referred to as
“local protectionism”:
Local protectionism means that in dealing with litigation,
courts are often biased in favor of parties from their own re-
gion. This problem is well-known and deeply-rooted in China
due to the lack of the courts’ independence—the local courts
are dependent on the local government in terms of funding,
and personnel decisions relating to the local judiciary are
also in the hands of the local government.33
Local protectionism subverts justice, and thus serves as a reason that
prevents parties from choosing to use mainland Chinese courts to ad-
judicate their cases. They would rather name a foreign court as their
court of choice in the hope, or expectation, of getting fair treatment by
judges in whom they can place their confidence and trust. The fact
that mainland Chinese courts are funded by their local government
enables the local government to interfere with the judicial process by
pressuring or instructing the court to make rulings in favor of local
businesses that contribute to the local economy by, for example, pay-
ing taxes and providing jobs. In light of that, if the foreign party
needs to sign a Court of Choice Agreement with a local party in main-
land China, it would most likely consider a jurisdiction outside
mainland China. Therefore, unless both the foreign and local Chinese
parties have a written agreement to designate the Hong Kong court
as their choice of court, then judicial recognition and enforcement
granted through the Arrangement would not be possible, owing to the
requirement set out in Article 1 of the Arrangement. This again ex-
plains why some parties may consider it difficult to satisfy that
requirement.
The requirement within Article 1 of the Arrangement conse-
quently needs proper characterization before it can be applied
universally to parties seeking foreign judicial recognition for judg-
ments involving HK-China CBI cases. The issue raised here merits
careful evaluation, although in practice the issue may be less serious
than one might think. As shown in Table 1 below, HK-China CBI
cases often involve a (parent) company representing a foreign party
incorporated in a tax haven jurisdiction outside Hong Kong and
33. Robin Hui Huang, Private Enforcement of Securities Law in China: A Ten-
Year Retrospective and Empirical Assessment, 61 AM. J. COMP. L. 757, 795 (2013). See
also Tom Ginsburg, Judicial Independence in East Asia: Lessons for China, in JUDI-
CIAL INDEPENDENCE IN CHINA: LESSONS FOR GLOBAL RULE OF LAW PROMOTION, supra
note 32, at 247.
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TABLE 1. HK-CHINA CBI CASES THAT MEET THE REQUIREMENT
WITHIN ARTICLE 1 OF THE ARRANGEMENT.
Place of Year of
Place of Company Insolvency Company
Company Name Registration Proceedings Insolvency
Akai Holdings Bermuda Hong Kong and 2000
Bermuda
Zhu Kuan (Hong Kong) Hong Kong Hong Kong 2004
Co. Ltd.
Euro-Asia Agricultural Bermuda Hong Kong 2004
(Holdings)
Moulin Global Eyecare Bermuda Hong Kong 2005
Holdings Limited
Ocean Grand Holdings Bermuda Hong Kong and 2006
Bermuda
U-Right International Bermuda Hong Kong 2008
Holdings Limited
Tak Fat Group Cayman Islands Hong Kong 2008
Peace Mark (Holdings) Bermuda Hong Kong 2008
Sanlu China China 2008
Asia Aluminum Holdings Bermuda Hong Kong 2009
Fu Ji Food and Catering Cayman Islands Hong Kong 2009
Services Holdings
First Natural Bermuda Unreported 2009
Pioneer Iron British Virgin Hong Kong and 2010
Islands British Virgin
Islands
Grande Holdings Bermuda Hong Kong 2011
Proview Technology Unreported China 2012
Zhejiang Glass China China 2013
Sources: SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST (public announcements section), http://www.
scmp.com/frontpage/hk; HKEx News Releases, HONG KONG EXCHANGES AND CLEAR-
ING LIMITED, http://www.hkex.com.hk/eng/newsconsul/hkexnews/2015news.htm.
mainland China. Most of these companies have their place of insol-
vency proceedings in Hong Kong, mainland China, or in both Hong
Kong and a tax haven jurisdiction, thereby meeting all the require-
ments within Article 1 of the Arrangement.
B. Changes Required
Before extending the Arrangement to cover HK-China CBI cases,
the following changes must be made:
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1. Removing the Requirement of “Monetary Judgments”
In insolvency proceedings, judicial rulings are not always pecuni-
ary in nature; judgments and orders can also be non-monetary. The
former refers to judgments that forbid the debtor company to con-
tinue trading, should the judge consider it has little or no prospect to
pay its debts when they fall due. The latter includes orders for spe-
cific performance by the debtor company or its directors, such as to
release accounting records and financial documents. Non-monetary
judgments or orders may also concern the appointment of liquidators,
the granting of injunctive relief, and/or the confirmation or granting
of certain rights such as the preferential rights associated with em-
ployee entitlements. Insolvency judgments or orders can be non-
monetary, owing to the fact that insolvency law contains very specific
procedural requirements, distinct from those in civil and commercial
law. For instance, in Hong Kong, the compulsory winding up or liqui-
dation of a company starts with the Hong Kong court’s appointment
of a liquidator. In the event that there is an appointment of a liquida-
tor by a court in Hong Kong to deal with the debtor company’s assets
in both Hong Kong and mainland China, the judgment would most
likely be barred from application of the Arrangement or the Mainland
Judgments (Reciprocal Enforcement) Ordinance. The reason is be-
cause the parties may fail to satisfy the “payment of money”
requirement provided in Article 1 of the Arrangement, because the
appointment of a liquidator is not a matter concerning payment.
2. Removing the Exclusion of “Any Employment Contracts”
Article 3 of the Interpretation provides that employment con-
tracts are excluded from the application of the Arrangement. Not
surprisingly, outstanding employment entitlements (e.g., unpaid sal-
aries and wages) are an integral part of a corporate insolvency case.
Since the resolution of HK-China CBI cases will inevitably involve
the need to pay and settle with the debtor company’s unpaid employ-
ees, the exclusion of employment contracts is unacceptable because
otherwise some creditors will receive favorable treatment by the Ar-
rangement (which facilitates judicial enforcement), while others
(unpaid employees, who are also creditors of the debtor company) will
not. It is worthwhile to note that the unfair result will be attained
regardless of how HK-China CBI cases are resolved, i.e., whether by
court judgment or by voluntary reorganization agreement. Unfair
treatment is a cause for concern since employees are a distinctive
class of creditors. Furthermore, different treatment of creditors con-
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travenes articles 13, 21(2), 22, and 32 of the Model Law,34 which
upholds the equal treatment of creditors.
3. Removing the Requirement of a Choice of Court Agreement
There are a number of reasons to remove the requirement for a
Choice of Court Agreement. First, the parties’ choice of court must be
surrendered if and when it is inconsistent with the Model Law’s des-
ignation (which will decide on which court is to stage the main
insolvency proceeding), if the Model Law can be applied to those HK-
China CBI involving a third jurisdiction other than Hong Kong and
mainland China. The main insolvency proceeding is defined as “the
proceeding pending in the debtor’s centre of main interests [which] is
expected to have principal responsibility for managing the insolvency
of the debtor regardless of the number of States in which the debtor
has assets and creditors.”35 In other words, the court of the main in-
solvency proceeding is the court within whose jurisdiction the debtor
company has its main business interests. Such a designation reflects
the universalism principle upheld by the Model Law because insol-
vency proceedings are collective by nature. Therefore, to holistically
and universally resolve a CBI case, the Model Law calls for only one
main insolvency proceeding to be carried out in the jurisdiction where
the debtor company’s center of main (business) interests is located,
regardless of how many concurrent (ancillary) proceedings are taking
place. Courts of non-main proceedings are bound to assist the court of
main proceeding by, say, remitting assets seized by their courts to the
court of the main insolvency proceeding, in order to facilitate equal
and collective distribution of assets amongst all creditors, regardless
of where those assets are located. If the Arrangement is to align with
the Model Law, the requirement in Article 1 of the Arrangement will
be difficult to satisfy because the parties’ choice of court cannot al-
ways be honored, if and when it is inconsistent with the Model Law’s
designation of a specific jurisdiction responsible for presiding over
the main insolvency proceeding.
Second, creditors may not always have a Choice of Court Agree-
ment with the debtor company, especially before the latter becomes
34. U.N. COMM’N ON INT’L TRADE LAW, UNCITRAL MODEL LAW ON CROSS-BORDER
INSOLVENCY WITH GUIDE TO ENACTMENT AND INTERPRETATION pt. 2 (Guide to Enact-
ment and Interpretation), 60 ¶ 119, 107 ¶ 240, U.N. Sales No. E.14.V.2 (2013), http://
www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/insolven/1997-Model-Law-Insol-2013-Guide-Enact
ment-e.pdf. Articles 13 and 32 of the Model Law prescribe that it “does not affect the
ranking of claims,” which include unpaid wages claims by China-based employees,
since Hong Kong courts regard them as foreign creditors and, conversely, unpaid
wages claims by Hong Kong-based employees, which are regarded similarly by Chi-
nese courts. Note that articles 21(2) and 22 of the Model Law concern relief that may
be granted by the court upon its recognition of a foreign proceeding and of the protec-
tion of creditors, which may be relevant to the circumstances of the case herein.
35. Id. at 19, ¶ 1 (explaining the purpose of the Model Law).
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insolvent. This makes the requirement in Article 1 of the Arrange-
ment difficult to enforce. Third, parties to a CBI case will
understandably choose a court that they believe will work in their
best interests should a dispute arise.
For the reasons stated above, the author suggests that it is not
necessary to restrict the choice of court to be either in Hong Kong or
mainland China. By insisting on the restrictive requirement of juris-
dictions agreements in mainland China or of applying Chinese law,
the Arrangement could encourage forum shopping by enabling “a
party to seize the Chinese court with the purpose to avoid a jurisdic-
tion clause concluded by it,”36 and therefore would “invalidate many
jurisdiction clauses which might be valid under the law of other coun-
tries.”37 This is especially true when the parties (e.g., creditors) are of
different backgrounds, located in different countries, and/or with dif-
ferent levels of intellectual or financial resources. Furthermore,
considering that a fair number of CBI cases between Hong Kong and
mainland China involve a parent company which is incorporated in a
tax haven jurisdiction, it is unlikely that different parties (e.g., credi-
tors, employees, shareholders) with conflicting interests could easily
reach an agreement over exclusive jurisdiction. Such an agreement
will be very difficult, if not impossible, to achieve amongst creditors
who find themselves mired in a complex CBI case.
It should be noted that a jurisdiction clause is “severable and in-
dependent from the main contract.”38 Yet, the restrictive
requirement of jurisdictions agreements in China could also lead to
invalid application of law, if choice-of-law rules are not provided (as is
the case in the PRC Civil Procedure Law)39 or applied wrongly (e.g.,
applying the lex causae40 where the lex fori41 should be applied in-
stead) for deciding the validity of the jurisdiction clause. Professor
Zheng Sophia Tang of The University of Leeds suggests:
Some Chinese courts treat jurisdiction clauses no differently
from underlying contracts and, as a result, apply the lex
causae to decide the existence and validity of a choice of
36. Zheng Sophia Tang, Effectiveness of Exclusive Jurisdiction Clauses in the Chi-
nese Courts—A Pragmatic Study, 61 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 459, 464 (2012).
37. Id.
38. Id. at 462.
39. Zhong Hua Ren Min Gong He Guo Min Shi Su Song Fa (
) [Civil Procedure Law of the People’s Republic of China] (promulgated by Pres-
idential Order No. 44, Apr. 9, 1991, with immediate effect, as amended by
Presidential Order No. 59, Oct. 28, 2007, and by Decision of Aug. 31, 2012).
40. Lex causae is Latin for the law governing the substance of the case, desig-
nated by the rules of conflict of laws. Glossary, EUROPEAN COMM’N: JUSTICE, http://ec.
europa.eu/justice/glossary/lex-fori_en.htm.
41. Lex fori is Latin for the laws of a forum, which is a term used in private inter-
national law (i.e., conflict of laws) to refer to the law of the court within which a
lawsuit is instituted or remedy sought. “Traditionally the lex fori governs questions of
procedure, regardless of the lex causae.” Id.
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court clause. This approach is subject to criticism because it
fails to comply with the doctrine of severability, which is a
common doctrine in the conflict of laws.42
One can observe that the internationalization of China’s econ-
omy has far outpaced the internationalization of its domestic
legislation; this might explain why the PRC Civil Procedure Law does
not provide choice-of-law rules. Despite this deficiency in lawmaking,
it should be upheld that in private international law (i.e., conflict of
laws), the jurisdiction agreement and thus the validity of a jurisdic-
tion clause is an issue relating to procedure; therefore, it should be
governed by the lex fori and not the lex causae unless the parties have
previously agreed otherwise. Fortunately, most mainland Chinese
courts use the lex fori to decide matters concerning a jurisdiction
clause.43
III. OTHER AVAILABLE OPTIONS FOR ENABLING MUTUAL JUDICIAL
RECOGNITION AND ASSISTANCE BETWEEN HONG KONG
AND MAINLAND CHINA
A. Signing a New Arrangement that Focuses on CBI Matters
The author makes this proposal because of the limited scope of
the Arrangement. First, by its usage of the term “particular legal re-
lationship,”44 the Arrangement envisaged a commercial contractual
relationship between the parties in dispute and applies only to lim-
ited types of judgments—that is, “monetary judgments relating to
commercial contracts.” Moreover, due to the restrictive condition of
requiring a prior agreement by the parties on court jurisdiction in
order for the Arrangement to apply, the parties (i.e., litigants) must
have submitted their contract dispute to the exclusive jurisdiction of
a Hong Kong or mainland Chinese court. Second, the Arrangement
only applies to “final judgments,” thereby excluding judicial orders or
rulings concerning procedural or interlocutory matters, which are
necessary in resolving disputes throughout the insolvency proceed-
ings. Third, the Arrangement concerns only “monetary judgments,”
excluding insolvency judgments or orders that are non-monetary but
aim to facilitate the procedural requirement such as the appointment
of liquidators. Last but not least, Article 9 of the Arrangement pro-
vides that recognition and enforcement of a judgment shall be refused
if the Chinese court considers that enforcement of a judgment made
by the Hong Kong court is contrary to the social and public interests
of mainland China. Likewise, the Hong Kong court can also consider
refusing to enforce a judgment made by the Chinese court if enforce-
42. Tang, supra note 36, at 462.
43. Id. at 463–64.
44. Arrangement, supra note 2, art. 3.
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ment would be contrary to the public policy of Hong Kong. The author
suggests adding the word “manifestly” before “contrary to the social
and public interests of mainland China” and “contrary to the public
policy of Hong Kong” in order to ensure that this particular restric-
tion upon judgment enforcement will not be invoked so easily as to
harm the effectiveness of the Arrangement.
B. Signing a Treaty
Treaty-signing has been an activity accelerated by demand after
China’s accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO) on Decem-
ber 11, 2001. Prior to that, since 1978, China participated in the
United Nations (UN) and other international organizations by at-
tending various treaty-making conferences sponsored by the UN or
other world governmental organizations.45 Keyuan Zou suggests that
China respects international law with respect to its practice of treaty-
making; where there is a conflict between a treaty that China had
acceded to and China’s relevant domestic law, the treaty prevails.46
In terms of the types of treaties, China has entered into over
ninety tax treaties;47 and, more recently, it has completed formal ne-
gotiations on a bilateral investment treaty with the United States48
and ratified a judicial cooperation treaty with Australia to combat
rising cross-border crime.49 But a treaty instituting judicial coopera-
tion on CBI cases is not yet envisaged. Judicial recognition assistance
will be required where there is a conflict-of-laws situation. Mainland
Chinese courts are no stranger to foreign-related cases, but they are
more accustomed to applying their domestic (i.e., Chinese) law. Ac-
cording to statistics published by the SPC:
Since 2001, in the judgments of foreign-related cases, the ap-
plication of Chinese laws averagely accounted for 90.83%
every year; foreign laws, about 3.73%; international treaties,
about 3.05%; international practices, about 1.05%; and in a
small portion of cases, Chinese laws and international trea-
ties and practices were both applicable at the same time
(accounting for about 1.33% [on average] and annually).50
45. Keyuan Zou, International Law in the Chinese Domestic Context, 44 VAL. U. L.
REV. 935, 935–36 (2010).
46. Id. at 938–39.
47. David G. Dunbar, Treaty Shopping and China’s Response (pt. 1), 23 J. INT’L
TAX’N 36 (2012).
48. US/China: Investment Treaty Could Fail on Blocked Bids, OXFORD ANALYTICA
DAILY BRIEF (Aug. 2, 2013).
49. China Ratifies Treaty on Judicial Recognition with Australia, XINHUA NEWS
(Oct. 31, 2006), available at http://en.people.cn/200611/01/print20061101_317106.
html.
50. Qisheng He, China’s Private International Law (1978–2008), 5 FRONTIERS OF
LAW IN CHINA 188, 200 (2010).
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This data might explain why China is not particularly active in
treaty-signing. Chinese academics also suggest that “when trying for-
eign-related civil and commercial cases, China’s courts basically
prefer Chinese laws to foreign laws and international treaties or
practices.”51 Regardless of the preferential choice by the mainland
Chinese courts, entering into a bilateral treaty between Hong Kong
and mainland China for the specific purpose of judicial recognition
and assistance is highly unlikely given the political relationship be-
tween the HKSAR and mainland China. Hong Kong’s status as a
Special Administrative Region means that it is a subordinated region
of its sovereign (China) and not an independent state that can other-
wise have capacity to sign a treaty. Under the Chinese politico-legal
system, the level of a SAR government is akin to that of a provincial
government. Hong Kong’s political status will thus prevent it from
signing a bilateral treaty with China because a treaty must be signed
between state authorities and Hong Kong does not qualify as one.
It is important to note that before Hong Kong’s reversion to Chi-
nese sovereignty on July 1, 1997, China regarded Hong Kong as a
foreign jurisdiction and, as such, judicial recognition between Hong
Kong and China was sought through international conventions.
First, the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign
Arbitral Awards of 1958 (the New York Convention) sets out the com-
mon legislative standards for the recognition of arbitration
agreements, stating that foreign and non-domestic arbitral awards
cannot be discriminated against and thus should be entitled to court
recognition and enforcement in the same way as domestic awards.52
In relation to this, the United Kingdom extended the New York Con-
vention to Hong Kong in 1975, therefore it is applicable by the courts
in Hong Kong.53 Second, the Convention on the Service Abroad of Ju-
dicial and Extrajudicial Documents in Civil and Commercial Matters
of 1965 (the Hague Convention) improved the organization of mutual
judicial assistance in cases of civil or commercial matters to enable a
judicial or extrajudicial document to be served abroad.54 The United
Kingdom also extended the Hague Convention to Hong Kong in
1970.55 After the reversion of sovereignty in 1997, both the New York
Convention and the Hague Convention ceased to be applicable be-
tween Hong Kong and mainland China. The Hong Kong–China
51. Id.
52. Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards
arts.1, 3, June 10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517, 330 U.N.T.S. 38, http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/
english/texts/arbitration/NY-conv/XXII_1_e.pdf.
53. Zhu, supra note 5, at 644.
54. Hague Conference on Private International Law, Convention on the Service
Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents in Civil or Commercial Matters, Nov.
15, 1965, 20 U.S.T. 361, 658 U.N.T.S. 163, http://www.hcch.net/upload/conventions/
txt14en.pdf.
55. Zhu, supra note 5, at 668.
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relationship is now governed by the Basic Law of Hong Kong, the
SAR’s de facto constitution under the “One Country, Two Systems”
principle. Although article 153 of the Basic Law provides that inter-
national agreements can be applied to Hong Kong, cross-border
matters between Hong Kong and China are not part of the “external
affairs” governed by Chapter VII of the Basic Law, to which article
153 belongs. That is because the “external affairs” will inevitably in-
volve a foreign state, and thus excludes Hong Kong.
As mentioned before, even after the return of Hong Kong to
China in 1997, Hong Kong has continued to be regarded as a foreign
jurisdiction by China, as evidenced by article 5 of the judicial inter-
pretation issued in 2002 by the SPC titled Provisions Concerning the
Judicial Problems of Foreign-Related Civil and Commercial Cases.56
Under the rubric of “One Country, Two Systems,” two judicial sys-
tems (in Hong Kong and mainland China, respectively) now operate
in parallel within one country.57
Besides, although article 5 of the EBL58 made provisions for rec-
ognition and enforcement of foreign corporate insolvency judgments,
it does not provide any mechanism to facilitate CBI matters, either
between two independent states or between the HKSAR and main-
land China. It is important to note that article 5 of the EBL refers
expressly to “the courts of foreign countries,” which therefore ex-
cludes the courts in HKSAR from relying on this specific provision to
seek judicial recognition or assistance from the mainland Chinese
courts.
C. Signing a Memorandum of Understanding
In the last two decades, China has signed Memoranda of Under-
standing (MOUs) with South Korea, Singapore, Macao SAR,
Pakistan, and Qatar for achieving the following respective purposes
with each country or territory: (1) avoiding double taxation and
preventing fiscal evasion,59 (2) free trade,60 (3) education exchanges
and cooperation,61 (4) strengthening the consultation and cooperation
56. Gong, supra note 3, at 58 (emphasis added).
57. Id. at 57.
58. Enterprise Bankruptcy Law of the People’s Republic of China art. 5 (promul-
gated by the Standing Comm., Nat’l People’s Cong., Aug. 27, 2006, effective June 1,
2007) CLI.1.7895(EN).
59. Memorandum of Understanding on the Agreement between the Government
of the People’s Republic of China and the Government of the Republic of Korea for the
Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with respect to
Taxes on Income, July 13, 2007 (unreported).
60. Memorandum of Understanding on the Free Trade Agreement and Other
Trade Issues Between the Government of the People’s Republic of China and the Gov-
ernment of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, Apr. 5, 2005 (unreported).
61. Memorandum of Understanding on Exchanges and Cooperation in the Field of
Education Between the Ministries of Education of the Republic of Singapore and the
People’s Republic of China, Mar. 21, 2002 (unreported).
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between government ministries,62 and (5) cultural cooperation.63
China’s accession to the WTO in 2001 has increased its use of MOUs
for making a greater political and economic impact on the world
stage. For example, on August 2, 2011, China’s State Administration
for Industry and Commerce and the U.S. Department of Justice and
Federal Trade Commission signed an MOU on antimonopoly and an-
titrust cooperation.64 Where the status of agreement-making bodies
is concerned, apart from country-to-country relations, an MOU can
also be signed between a country’s central government and a local
government for carrying out certain regulatory or administrative
targets.65 Furthermore, a “notice” may be issued by a state agency in
order to facilitate the “earnest implementation”66 of an MOU signed
between the governments of signatory countries.
China’s legal history provides evidence that MOUs were often
deployed by China to reach certain agreements with Hong Kong, even
when Hong Kong was a British colony. In 1991, the United Kingdom
and Chinese governments signed the Memorandum of Understand-
ing Concerning the Construction of the New Airport in Hong Kong
and Related Questions—evidence of the practical implementation of
the Sino-British Joint Declaration which is the instrument announc-
62. Memorandum of Understanding Between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of
the People’s Republic of China and The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the State of
Qatar, Apr. 9, 1999 (unreported).
63. Memorandum of Understanding on Cultural Cooperation Between the Minis-
try of Culture of the People’s Republic of China and the Ministry of Information and
the Arts of the Republic of Singapore, Oct. 15, 1996 (unreported).
64. Xiaosong Zhang & Zihao Zhang, XNA: China, US Sign Memorandum of Un-
derstanding on Anti-Monopoly Cooperation, XINHUA NEWS, Aug. 4, 2011.
65. Guo Jia Shui Wu Zong Ju Guan Yu Yin Fa Nei Di He Ao Men Te Bie Xing
Zheng Qu Guan Yu Dui Suo De Bi Mian Shuang Chong Zheng Shui He Fang Zhi Tou
Lou Shui De An Pai Yi Ding Shu He Liang Jie Bei Wang Lu De Tong Zhi
(
) [Notice of the State Administration of Taxation on
Issuing the Protocol and the Memorandum of Understanding Concerning the “Ar-
rangement Between the Mainland of China and the Macao Special Administrative
Region for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion
with Respect to Taxes on Income”] (promulgated July 24, 2009), 2009 GUO SHUI HAN
( ) no. 396.
66. Fo Shan Shi Guo Jia Shui Wu Ju Zhuan Fa Guo Jia Shui Wu Zong Ju Guan
Yu Zhong Hua Ren Min Gong He Guo Zheng Fu He Da Han Min Guo Zheng Fu Guan
Yu Dui Suo De Bi Mian Shuang Chong Zheng Shui He Fang Zhi Tou Lou Shui De Xie
Ding Liang Jie Bei Wang Lu You Guan Tiao Kuan Huan Han Sheng Xiao Zhi Xing De
Tong Zhi (
) [Notice of the State Taxation Bureau of Foshan on Forwarding and Distributing
the Memorandum of Understanding on the “Agreement between the Government of
the People’s Republic of China and the Government of the Republic of Korea for the
Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with respect to
Taxes on Income”] ¶ 1 (promulgated July 8, 2008), 2008 FO GUO SHUI HAN ( )
no. 389.
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ing the implementation of the policy and principle of “One Country,
Two Systems.”67
The “One Country, Two Systems” paradigm, created by the late
Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping to address the conflict between Hong
Kong’s capitalist market economy and mainland China’s socialist
economy, provides a useful background that illustrates China’s desire
to sign MOUs in the pursuit of certain political and economic out-
comes. Recognition and enforcement was granted by and between the
Chinese central government and Hong Kong’s local authorities for
undertaking certain political, economic, and administrative actions
or upholding the rule of law under the Basic Law of Hong Kong.68
Unless otherwise indicated, an MOU may work to the same effect as
a treaty. For example, the law of treaty interpretation in the United
States69 “lists many of the other names carried by documents which
fall under this definition: ‘Among the terms used are: treaty, conven-
tion, agreement, protocol, covenant, charter, statute, act, declaration,
concordat, exchange of notes, agreed minute, memorandum of agree-
ment, memorandum of understanding, and modus vivendi.’ ”70 Justin
Lowe suggests that “whatever their designation, all agreements have
the same legal status, except as their provisions or the circumstances
of their conclusion indicate otherwise.”71
There are advantages and disadvantages to deploying an MOU
to achieve certain political, legal, and administrative purposes. The
advantage to signing an MOU is that it is rather flexible: parties to
an MOU can often suspend or opt out of certain agreements for an
unspecified period of time. The disadvantage, however, is that an
MOU tends to have less binding effect in comparison to a treaty. The
legal effect of an MOU is not uniform; that is because although an
MOU “could be construed as a contract, courts will not necessarily
bind the government to every memorandum signed.”72 In certain
cases, “[s]ignatories [to an MOU] ‘agree that this [MOU] shall have
no legal effect or impose a legally binding obligation’ but otherwise
identify a laundry list of things on which they ‘agree’ to work together
on, including information sharing, cooperation, and promotion of cer-
67. Albert H.Y. Chen, Some Reflections on Hong Kong’s Autonomy, 24 H.K. L.J.
173, 178 (1994).
68. William I. Friedman, China’s One Country, Two Systems Paradigm Extends
Itself Beyond the Mainland’s Borders to the Southern Provincial Government of Hong
Kong, 11 J. TRANSNAT’L L. & POL’Y 65 (2001).
69. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 301 cmt. (1987) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT (THIRD)].
70. Justin Lowe, What Would Grotius Do? Methods and Implications of Incorpo-
rating the Contract Law Doctrine of Illusory Promises into the Law of Treaty
Interpretation, 6 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 703, 706 n.12 (2007) (quoting RE-
STATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 69).
71. Id.
72. Timothy E. Steigelman, New Model for Disaster Relief: A Solution to the Posse
Comitatus Conundrum, 57 NAVAL L. REV. 105, 126 (2009).
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tain programs.”73 Under these circumstances, signatories to the
MOU would avoid creating rule-making institutions, meaning the
MOU only serves to reflect a political or non-binding intent.74
IV. COMMENTS AND FURTHER ASSESSMENT
Professor Wei Wang of Fudan University’s School of Law in
China suggests that there are meaningful differences between the
terms “agreement” and “arrangement” and that mainland China’s
choice of the word “arrangement” in the title of the Closer Economic
Partnership Arrangement was deliberate:
From the negotiating history of the CEPA, it appears the use
of the term “arrangement” was the result of an understand-
ing between Mainland China and HKSAR negotiators that
most FTAs [Free Trade Agreements] in the world are prefer-
ential agreements among states, while the negotiated trade
agreement between Mainland China and the HKSAR was
under one country, China. Therefore, based on the principle
of the “one country, two systems,” the agreement [of CEPA]
was entitled arrangement.75
By the same token, the term “Arrangement” used in 2006 by the SPC
to conclude the bilateral agreement between Hong Kong and main-
land China that aims to facilitate judicial recognition must be read
into as China’s intention in upholding the “one country” aspect of the
“One Country, Two Systems” principle in relation to Hong Kong.
That is perhaps why the negotiated bilateral agreement in 2006 for
judicial recognition between Hong Kong and mainland China was
also entitled “arrangement.” The interpretation by Professor Wei
Wang reflects the view held by Lung Wan Pun, senior government
counsel with the HKSAR’s Department of Justice, who specializes in
international law and believes that Hong Kong’s status as a SAR that
practices different social, economic, and legal systems from the rest of
mainland China rendered it necessary for special arrangements to be
made “to allow for a system for the application and conclusion of trea-
ties specifically in relation to the Hong Kong SAR . . . .”76
Moreover, according to the Constitution of mainland China,
73. Duncan B. Hollis, The Elusive Foreign Compact, 73 MO. L. REV. 1071, 1089
n.74 (2008) (quoting a 2007 MOU between the Canadian province of British Columbia
and the State of Oregon). See also id. at 1084 n.50.
74. Id. at 1089.
75. Wei Wang, CEPA: A Lawful Free Trade Agreement Under “One Country, Two
Customs Territories?”, 10 LAW & BUS. REV. AMERICAS 647, 654 (2004).
76. Lung Wan Pun, Application and Conclusion of Treaties in the Hong Kong Spe-
cial Administrative Region of the People’s Republic of China: Sixteen Years of Practice,
12 CHINESE J. INT’L L. 589, 590 (2013).
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Treaties and important agreements refer to: [1] Treaties of
friendship and cooperation, treaties of peace and other trea-
ties of a political nature; [2] Treaties and agreements
concerning territory and delimitation of boundary lines; [3]
Treaties and agreements which contain stipulations incon-
sistent with the laws of the People’s Republic of China; [4]
Treaties and agreements which are subject to ratification as
agreed by the contracting parties; [5] Other treaties and
agreements subject to ratification.77
It should be noted that the Standing Committee of the National
People’s Congress is tasked with the responsibility of ratifying trea-
ties and important agreements entered into by and between China
and foreign states.78 In contrast, the Arrangement was concluded by
mutual consultation between the SPC in China and the HKSAR, in
accordance with article 95 of the Basic Law of Hong Kong. Conse-
quently, the Arrangement could not possibly be viewed as a treaty or
agreement involving foreign parties but rather as an understanding
between the courts of mainland China and the HKSAR, as the title of
the Arrangement suggests.
In terms of facilitating “judicial cooperation,” as early as 1998, a
SPC Circular79 permitted Taiwanese judgments to be recognized and
enforced by the mainland Chinese courts. Mirroring the Arrange-
ment with the HKSAR, mainland China and the Macao SAR signed
an Arrangement on Mutual Recognition and Enforcement of Judg-
ments on Civil and Commercial Matters on February 28, 2006, which
became effective on April 1, 2006.80 Even though the HKSAR was the
first special administrative region in China, Professor Xianchu Zhang
and the late Professor Philip Smart, both of the University of Hong
Kong, suggest that “in developing direct cross-border judicial assis-
tance, Hong Kong . . .  has fallen behind both the Macao SAR and
Taiwan.”81 This might explain the non-enforcement of each other’s
judgments by the mainland Chinese and Hong Kong courts. Profes-
sors Zhang and Smart suggested:
77. Wang, supra note 75, at 659. See also Zhong Hua Ren Min Gong He Guo Di
Jie Tiao Yue Cheng Xu Fa ( ) [Law of the People’s Re-
public of China on the Procedure of the Conclusion of Treaties] art. 7 (promulgated by
the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Dec. 28, 1990, with immediate effect)
LawInfoChina No. CLI.1.4922(EN), translated at http://www.lawinfochina.com/dis
play.aspx?lib=law&id=1213&CGid=.
78. Wang, supra note 75, at 659.
79. Professors Xianchu Zhang and Philip Smart pointed out that on May 22, 1998
the Chinese Supreme People’s Court issued the Provisions on Recognition of Civil
Judgments of Taiwan Courts by the People’s Courts. See Xianchu Zhang & Philip
Smart, Development of Regional Conflict of Laws: On the Arrangement of Mutual Rec-
ognition and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters Between
Mainland China and Hong Kong SAR, 36 H.K. L.J. 553, 556 (2006).
80. Id. at 557.
81. Id.
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Based on their experience, some mainland judges have
pointed out that it is much more difficult for Mainland judg-
ments to be recognised and enforced in Hong Kong than in
Macao . . . The then Secretary for Justice [for the HKSAR],
Elsie Leung, admitted that it would be ridiculous if after the
handover Mainland judgments could be enforced in foreign
countries, but not in Hong Kong.82
In light of the large trading volume and multitudinous investment
activities across the Hong Kong–mainland China border, as well as
the lawsuits associated with those activities resulting from the debt-
ors’ non-payment of its debt, any further reciprocal non-enforcement
of judgments for HK-China CBI cases by courts of either side is
bound to cause serious legal confusion. It is under this circumstance
that the author is raising public awareness and proposing legal meth-
ods to fill the legal lacuna since the Arrangement falls short in giving
judicial recognition or assistance for judgments on HK-China CBI
disputes.
CONCLUSION
Since there already exists an international soft law for CBI mat-
ters—namely, the Model Law—which, although not a treaty, still
promotes judicial recognition, assistance, and enforcement between
courts overseeing insolvency proceedings, the law (or rules of interna-
tional law on judicial recognition) “should not be left to divergent and
parochial state interpretations.”83 Unfortunately, this argument is
open to challenges in the present context of HK-China CBI matters,
as neither Hong Kong nor mainland China has adopted the Model
Law. Therefore, unless both the Hong Kong and Chinese insolvency
regulations are in line with the current international framework (as
reflected in and represented by the Model Law), either the extension
of the (existing) Arrangement after substantial revisions or the sign-
ing of a new Arrangement will be necessary and crucial for parties
that seek judicial recognition and enforcement of HK-China CBI
judgments rendered in either the Hong Kong or mainland Chinese
courts. The overarching aim of extending the (existing) Arrangement
or signing a new one is to avoid the duplication of litigation costs
(e.g., counsel fees, court fees, enforcement fees) and time associated
with duplicative insolvency court procedures for proceedings that are
based on the same facts and the same debtor-creditor relationships,
where one action is initiated in Hong Kong and the other in mainland
China. This is a natural conclusion that can be inferred from article
82. Id.
83. William J. Aceves, The Vienna Convention on Consular Relations: A Study of
Rights, Wrongs, and Remedies, 31 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 257, 301 (1998).
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16 of the Interpretation, which provides that “[t]he scope of reciprocal
recognition and enforcement of judgments by the courts of the Main-
land and of the HKSAR shall include, apart from the sum specified in
the judgment, any interest that becomes due under the judgment as
well as lawyers’ fees and litigation costs that have been certified by
the court . . . .”84
Professors Zhang and Smart projected that the impact of the Ar-
rangement will be minimal due to its very restricted scope.85
According to Jose´ Alejandro Carballo Leyda, in the Notice of the Su-
preme People’s Court on the Implementation of the [New York]
Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral
Awards86 (to which China has acceded), which was issued by the SPC
on April 10, 1987 (the “SPC 1987 Notice”), the term “commercial legal
relationship” was defined as follows:
[A] non-exhaustive list of examples such as: “disputes relat-
ing to the sale of goods, property leasing, construction
contracting, contract processing, technology transfer, equity
joint ventures, cooperative joint ventures, prospecting and
developing natural resources, insurance, credit, personal
services, agency, consultancy services and carriage of goods
by sea, civil aviation, rail transport and road transport, as
well as product liability, environmental pollution, marine
casualties and title.”87
The author notes that Leyda wrote this statement in the context of
recognition and enforcement of arbitration awards in mainland
China, Hong Kong, and Taiwan; however, given that no illustrative
definition was given by the SPC for the underlying Arrangement, the
SPC 1987 Notice can provide some reference value. One thing is cer-
tain: the Arrangement excludes HK-China CBI matters from its
application. The irony is that HK-China CBI matters often arise in
the context of joint venture enterprises that fail, and such enterprises
are the usual investment vehicles deployed by Hong Kong and main-
land Chinese parties wishing to do business together. It is based on
this interesting fact that the author examined the possibility of ex-
84. See Interpretation, supra note 30, art. 16.
85. Both professors considered that the Arrangement “will likely be of quite lim-
ited use in the future.” See Zhang & Smart, supra note 79, at 553.
86. Zui Gao Ren Min Fa Yuan Guan Yu Zhi Xing Wo Guo Jia Ru De Cheng Ren Ji
Zhi Xing Wai Guo Zhong Cai Cai Jue Gong Yue De Tong Zhi (
) [Notice of the Supreme Peo-
ple’s Court on the Implementation of the [New York] Convention on the Recognition
and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards Acceded to by China] (promulgated Oct.
4, 1987), 1987 FA JING FA ( ) no. 5.
87. Jose´ Alejandro Carballo Leyda, A Uniform, Internationally Oriented Legal
Framework for the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards in Main-
land China, Hong Kong and Taiwan?, 6 CHINESE J. INT’L L. 345, 350 (2007).
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tending the Arrangement to cover HK-China CBI matters. However,
due to the complexity of the insolvency legal relationships and court
procedures, a separate and tailor-made Arrangement for the judicial
recognition and enforcement of HK-China CBI matters would be
more effective in achieving the substantive and procedural justice
sought by litigants in HK-China CBI disputes.
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